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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: .1998TERM 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead ~U Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University and Joseph Basessler , CWRU Law School, Class of 2000 
~ This article summarizes many of the criminal law deci-S:: sions decided by the United States Supreme Court during 
l) the last term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Knock and Announce 
In United States v. Ramirez, 118 S.Ct. 992 (1998), the 
Oregon Police, acting on a tip, searched Ramirez's garage, 
looking for an escaped prisoner, Alan Shelby. The police 
observed a man resembling Shelby outside of Ramirez's 
home and obtained a "no-knock" warrant. During the initial 
raid, the police broke a window in the garage and pointed a 
',\~un into the window to stop the occupants from arming 
·" £hemselves. At the sound of the break-in, Ramirez grabbed 
his pistol and shot into the garage. The police then shouted 
"police," and he surrendered. Because Ramirez owned mul-
tiple guns and was a convicted felon, he was indicted on 
federal charges for possession of a firearm by a felon. 
In Richards v. Wisconsin, 118 S.Ct. 1416 (1997), the 
Supreme Court had held that no knock warrants are justified 
when police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that 
knocking and announcing their authority before entering 
would be dangerous or futile, or inhibit the effective investi-
gation of the crime. Ramirez argued that a higher standard 
should apply when property is destroyed. The Court dis-
agreed, holding that the lawfulness of the warrant is not 
based on whether there is property damage. The standard 
for a "no-knock" warrant is "reasonable suspicion" that an-
nouncing their presence would be dangerous and ineffec-
tive. The Court found that "reasonable suspicion" did exist 
and the warrant was valid; Shelby had a history of violence 
and a reliable informant had stated that he may have ac-
cess to weapons. However, the manner in which the war-
rant is executed is important. Because the Fourth 
Amendment is based on reasonableness, excessive and 
unnecessary damage is prohibited. The damage in this 
case was not excessive or unnecessary. 
The Court also rejected a claim that 18 U.S.C. § 3109, 
the federal statute that codifies the common law rule, was 
violated because there were no "exigent circumstances" to 
justify the destruction of property. According to the Court, 
the statute authorizes the destruction of property in certain 
circumstances. Therefore, as long as the officers have rea-
son, they may incur property damage. 
Parolees 
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 
118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998), the Supreme Court reversed a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling, which had applied the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to parole hearings. As 
one condition of parole, Scott could not possess a firearm. 
Parole officials had received some evidence from a reliable 
source that Scott kept weapons in his home. Parole offi-
cers, who searched the home, found firearms and a bow 
and arrows. Consequently, the parole board sent Scott 
back to prison. The Commonwealth Court reversed, based 
on the fact that the warrant was improper, and the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule 
does not bar evidence in parole hearings. Although the 
search was illegal, the use of the evidence was not. The 
Court found that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally 
mandated but is rather a judicial rule created to deter illegal 
searches. Therefore, the burdens and benefits of the rule 
must be weighed. The Court beiieved that the cost of allow-
ing dangerous criminals to remain on the streets after they 
have violated their parole is quite high. In addition, there is 
a great likelihood that these criminals will commit future 
crimes. In contrast, the Court held that there would be very 
little added deterrence since so much deterrence already 
exist against illegal searches. 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
In Gray v. Maryland, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (1998), a co-defen-
dant's confession in a joint trial had been edited by replac-
ing Gray's name with a blank space or the word "deleted:' 
The Supreme Court found that this type of redaction violat-
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ed the rule in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The de-
fendants were tried jointly for beating a person to death. 
One of the defendants, Anthony Bell, confessed to the 
Baltimore police that he and others had killed the victim, 
naming only Gray and another man. The trial court denied 
Gray's motion for a separate trial and admitted Bell's con-
fession into evidence, ordering that the statement be redact-
ed. The confession was changed so that the names of Gray 
and the other named assailant were replaced with the word 
"deleted:' 
The Supreme Court held that the cursory revisions to 
Bell's statement did not place the confession outside the 
bounds of the Bruton rule. The admission of the statement 
by a non-testifying co-defendant, naming the other defen-
dant, violated the Sixth Amendment's right to cross-exami-
nation. The Court found that the revisions made in the 
statement were transparent. By using the word "deleted" 
and asking the detectives if Gray's arrest was based on the 
confession made clear what the edited words were. 
"Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious 
blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other 
similarly obvious indications of alteration ... leave state-
ments that, considered as a class, so closely resemble 
Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view the law 
must require the same result." ld. at 1155. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Immunity: Foreign Prosecutions 
In United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998), the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Fifth 
Amendment protects against self-incrimination in a foreign 
court. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of the 
Department of Justice's Criminal Division subpoenaed 
Balsys, a resident alien. The OSI sought testimony con-
cerning Balsys' activities between 1940 and 1944 and his 
1961 immigration to the United States. Balsys claimed Fifth 
Amendment protection because he feared prosecution in a 
foreign nation (Lithuania, Israel, or Germany). 
The Supreme Court held that fear of prosecution in a for-
eign court fell outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court found that, although Balsys was an alien, he was 
still considered a "person" under the Clause and thus enti-
tled to the same protections as citizens. The critical ques-
tion, however, was whether a foreign prosecution was "a 
criminal case" for the purposes of the Clause. Balsys 
sought to argue a literal meaning to the phrase "any criminal 
Case:' The Court, however, noted that the other provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment (e.g., grand jury indictment, double 
jeopardy, due process) applied only to the United States, 
and therefore it would be odd for one clause to be so broad. 
The Court' found that there was no common-law rule or 
practice that fell within the bounds of this case. Looking 
back at the history of the Amendment, the Court noted that 
the Amendment did not apply to the states until Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Prior to that time, a person fac-
ing federal prosecution could not assert the privilege based 
on the fear of prosecution in state courts. After Malloy, this 
rule changed. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 
(1964), the Court wrote:· 
After Malloy; the Fifth Amendment limitation could no 
longer be seen as framed for one jurisdiction alone, 
each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the 
same claim of privilege flowing from the one litigation. 
Since fear of prosecution in the one jurisdiction bound 
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by the Clause now implicated the very privilege bind-
ing upon the other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recog-
nized that if a witness could not assert the privilege in 
such circumstances, the witness could be "whipsawed 
into incriminating himself under both state and federal 
law even though the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination is applicable to both:' ld. at 2227 (ci-
tation omitted). 
This reasoning simply does not apply to foreign jurisdic-
tions. The Court also rejected expansive language in its 
prior cases which based the privilege, in part, on the "invio-
lability" of the human personality. "[W)hat we find in practice 
is not the protection of personal testimonial inviolability, but 
a conditional protection of testimonial privacy subject to 
basic limits recognized before the framing and refined 
through immunity doctrine in the intervening years:· ld. at 
2232. 
Clemency Procedures 
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 
1244 (1998), the Supreme Court upheld Ohio's voluntary 
clemency process. A prisoner sentenced to death filed suit 
against the State, arguing that its voluntary clemency 
process violated his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment 
rights. Woodard was convicted of murder while committing 
a carjacking and sentenced to death. The conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Court de-
nied certiorari. The Ohio Adult Parole Authority then started 
the clemency process in accordance with state law. Before 
the first voluntary interview, Woodard filed suit for the viola-
tion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Though the district court ruled for the State, the Sixth Circuit 
did find something to Woodard's claim. The Sixth Circuit , ~; .1~ held that there was no state created liberty interest in 'f P 
clemency, and therefore the district court was right in dis-
missing the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. 
This is because clemency rests solely with the discretion of 
the Governor. However, the court of appeals did find that 
there was a "second strand" of due process because the 
clemency process has become an integral part of the death 
sentence procedure. In addition, the Sixth Circuit found that 
there was no real choice when it came to the clemency 
hearing- one either confessed, incriminating oneself, or 
did not receive clemency. The court of appeals found this 
constitutionally suspect. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the volun-
tary nature of the interview did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment. The Amendment protects only against com-
pelled incrimination. The Court found that even though the 
interview is not confidential and that authorities may draw 
adverse inference from failure to answer, the testimony is 
not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
Woodard in that situation faces the same situation as a 
criminal defendant in a trial. Difficult choices, even under 
the pressures of a criminal trial, do not necessarily amount 
to constitutional "compulsion." The Court wrote: 
Long ago we held that a defendant who took the stand 
in his own defense could not claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination when the prosecution sought to 
cross examine him. A defendant who takes the stand 
in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior 1"' 
convictions without violation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. A defendant whose motion for acquittal at 
the close of the Government's case is denied must 
then elect whether to stand on his motion or to put on 
a defense, with the accompanying risk that in doing so 
he will augment the Government's case against him. 
In each of these situations, there are undoubted pres-
sures - generated by the strength of the Govern-
-- ment's case against him- pushing the criminal de-
-~ fendant to testify. But it ~as never been ~uggested t~at 
- such pressures constitute "compulsion" for F1fth 
Amendment purposes. ld. (citations omitted). 
The Court also rejected the due process argument, with 
four Justices finding that the Due Process Clause did not 
apply to clemency proceedings and four Justices finding 
that due process had been satisfied in this case. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Criminal-Civil Distinction 
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the de-
fendant was convicted of submitting 65 false claims under 
the federal Medicare program. While working for a medical 
laboratory, he submitted claims for a $12 reimbursement for 
$3 procedures. The total amount of the fraud was $585. 
Halper was convicted on all 65 counts, as well as 16 counts 
of mail fraud, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment 
for two years and fined $5,000. The Government then insti-
tuted a civil action under the False Claims Act. Based on 
the criminal verdict, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment. Under the Act, a person is liable for $2000 plus two 
times the amount of damages for each count. Thus, a statu-
tory penalty of more than $130,000 was required. The 
Court found this penalty barred by the double jeopardy safe-
guard, writing: 
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy 
11Ciause a defendant who already has been punished ~ ,. in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an 
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, 
but only as a deterrent or retribution. 
In Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), the 
Supreme Court reversed Halper, replacing its analysis with 
the two-step approach set forth in United States v. Ward, 
448 U.S. 242 (1980). The Government initially imposed 
monetary penalties and occupational disbarment on peti-
tioners for violating federal banking statutes. The petitioners 
were later indicted for essentially the same conduct, at 
which time they raised the double jeopardy issue. 
in the Court's view, "Halper's test proved unworkable, 
creating confusion by attempting to distinguish between 
'punitive' and 'nonpunitive' penalties:· ld. at 491. Under the 
proper approach, the first step is to determine (as a matter 
of statutory interpretation) if the legislature intended the 
punishment to be criminal or civil. Second, even if the legis-
lature intended a civil penalty, the courts may determine 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in pur-
pose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as 
a civil remedy to a criminal penalty. In making this determi-
nation, several useful guideposts are relevant: (1) whether 
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint: (2); 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; 
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 
a 'i) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
t- Cnishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the be-
havior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an 
alternative purpose may rationally be assigned for it; and (7) 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
3 
144, 168-69 (1963). The Court went on to hold that the 
statutory scheme was civil in nature. 
Multiple Punishment 
In Monge v. California, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998), the 
Supreme Court addressed the double jeopardy implications 
of an enhanced sentencing procedure. In Bullington v. 
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981 ), the Supreme Court had ap-
plied the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital sentencing, rul-
ing that a defendant who received a life sentence in a death 
penalty case could not be sentenced to death following a 
successful appeal and retrial. Bullington, however, was an 
exception to the Court's position that double jeopardy pro-
tection did not extend to sentencing proceedings. Monge 
argued that Bullington should be extended to other types of 
sentencing procedures. 
Under California's "three-strikes" law, a convicted felon 
with one prior conviction for a serious crime can qualify for 
sentence enhancement after a second conviction. This sys-
tem has several procedural safeguards, including the right 
to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, and the application of the rules of evi-
dence. 
Monge was convicted of three drug violations. At the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecution sought to have his sen-
tence enhanced based on a prior assault with a deadly 
weapon conviction. The trial court found that the prior con-
viction was a sufficient predicate for enhancement. A 
California court of appeals subsequently ruled that the evi-
dence was insufficient to warrant enhaAcement. In addition, 
the court held that a remand would violate double jeopardy, 
basing this decision on Bullington. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not apply because there is no "offense:• 
Sentence determinations are not analogous to an acquittal. 
The Court wrote: "[l]t is a 'well-established part of our consti-
tutional jurisprudence' that the guarantee against double 
jeopardy neither prevents the prosecution from seeking re-
view of a sentence nor restricts the length of a sentence im-
posed upon retrial after a defendant's successful appeal." 
118 S.Ct. at 2251. The Bullington exception was based on 
the death penalty sanction. The emotional importance of a 
death penalty hearing in addition to its procedural safe-
guards is what creates the narrow exception in the double 
jeopardy rule. Therefore, the Court found that the rehearing 
of a sentence enhancement did not qualify as an exception 
to the rule. 
POLYGRAPH: RIGHTTO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
lh United States v. Sheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998). the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that adoption of a per se rule of 
·exclusion for polygraph evidence is not unconstitutional. 
The Court acknowledged once more the right to present a 
defense, albeit a qualified right. "A defendant's right to pre-
sent relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject 
to reasonable restrictions." ld. at 1264. In the Court's view, 
evidence "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present 
a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or dispropor-
tionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. 
Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be 
unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it -
has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." ld. 
Justice Thomas's opinion identified three interests that 
support the per se rule of exclusion: (1) ensuring that only 
reliable evidence is introduced at trial, (2) preserving the 
jury's role in determining credibility, and (3) avoiding litiga-
tion of collateral issues. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy 
along with three other Justices rejected the second and 
third interests. As to reliability, Justice Thomas's opinion 
notes that "the scientific community remains extremely po-
larized about the reliability of polygraph techniques." ld. at 
1265. Justice Thomas also cited the preservation of the 
jury's role in determining credibility. "By its very nature, 
polygraph evidence may diminish the jury's role in making 
credibility determinations." ld. at 1267. A third reason sup-
porting the per se rule of exclusion is, in Justice Thomas's 
view, the avoidance of litigation on collateral issues, which 
"prolongs criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury 
from its central function of determining guilt or innocence." 
I d. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed out 
that Federal Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule and 
the "invading the province of the jury" argument has been 
rejected under most modern evidence codes. Significantly, 
he also wrote: 
I doubt that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and 
some later case might present a more compelling case 
for introduction of the testimony than this one does. 
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial 
court in admitting and excluding scientific evidence is 
not a constitutional one, ... there is some tension be-
tween that rule and our holding today. And, as Justice 
Stevens points out [in dissent], there is much inconsis-
tency between the Government's extensive use of 
polygraph to make vital security determinations and 
the argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy 
of these tests. ld. at 1269. 
GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION 
In Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419 (1998), the 
Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, which had held that a white defendant did 
not have standing to bring equal protection, due process, 
and Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claims for discrimi-
nation against African Americans in grand juries. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court found that a white defendant ac-
cused of killing another white man did not meet the "consid-
erable and substantial impact" criteria set in Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400 (1991 ), as a requirement for standing. 
A grand jury in Evangeline Parish Louisiana indicted 
Campbell for second degree murder. In the history of the 
parish no African American had ever been appointed grand 
jury foreperson. The Supreme Court held that Campbell did 
have standing to bring both due process and equal protec-
tion claims for discrimination against African Americans. In 
Powers, which concerned discrimination in the use of 
peremptory challenges, the Court had set forth three condi-
tions for third-party standing. First, the defendant must suf-
fer an "injury in fact." Second, there must be a close rela-
tionship to the excluded juror's. Finally, there must be some 
hindrance to the excluded jurors assertion of their own 
rights, such as economic disincentives to pursue the issue. 
The Court found that all three conditions were satisfied. 
DEATH PENALTY CONSIDERED 
Lesser Included Offenses 
In Hopkins v. Reeves, 118 S.Ct. 1895 (1998), the 
Supreme Court considered whether a capital defendant had 
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a right to a jury instruction on lesser-included-offenses. ThE 
defendant was convicted of two counts of felony murder an• 
sentenced to death. The defendant had raped and mur-
dered two women at a Religious Society of Friends meetin~ 
house. Both were stabbed. One of the victims identified th1 
defendant as the assailant. The police charged the defen-
dant with felony-murder based on the fact that the murders 
were committed during the commission of rape. Under 
Nebraska law, this is first-degree felony murder. The defen-
dant requested an instruction on second-degree murder 
and manslaughter as lesser-included offenses. The trial 
court refused. On a habeas corpus petition, the Eighth 
Circuit held the failure to instruct unconstitutional under 
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), which had struck 
down an Alabama law that prohibited juries from being in-
structed on lesser-included-offenses in capital cases. This 
law created an artificial barrier between capital and noncap-
ital cases because lesser-included-offense instructions were 
permissible in the latter. 
The Court held that Beck did not mandate jury instruc-
tions on offenses that are not lesser included offenses 
under state law. It had long been the opinion of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court that second-degree murder and 
manslaughter are not lesser included offense of felony-mur-
der. Therefore, Beck did not apply. Applying Beck here 
would force states to create lesser-included crimes in capi-
tal cases when none existed. 
Mitigation Instruction 
In Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757 (1998), 
Buchanan was convicted of the murder of his father, step-
mother, and two brothers. During the two-day sentencing 
hearing, the defense counsel presented evidence of the de-
fendant's background and his mental and emotional prob- '1i 
lems. Both the defense counsel and the prosecutor dis-
cussed the mitigating factors in the penalty phase. The trial 
court refused Buchanan's request for an instruction that 
contained the particular statutory definitions of mitigating 
factors. The trial court instructed the jury to hand down the 
death penalty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
conduct was ''vile;· the aggravating factor under state law. In 
addition, the trial court instructed the jury to consider all the 
evidence when deciding which punishment was appropriate. 
Buchanan was sentenced to death. 
The Supreme Court found that refusing to instruct the 
jury on the particular statutory definitions of mitigating fac-
tors did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
The instruction told the jury to consider all the evidence, in-
cluding the mitigating factors discussed in the sentencing 
hearing. The instructions did not preclude the jury from ex-
amining the evidence of mitigating factors. The Court sum-
marized its holding as follows: "This case calls on us to de-
cide whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital 
jury be instructed on the concept of mitigation evidence 
generally, or on particular statutory mitigating factors. We 
hold it does not:' ld. at 758-59. 
Mental Competence 
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998), 
the Supreme Court allowed a second writ of habeas corpus 
for incompetence after the first had been denied for being 
premature. The respondent was convicted of two counts o1 1"' 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He lost all di-
rect appeals in Arizona. He filed a number of state habeas 
corpus petitions at the same time he filed three federal 
habeas petitions. All the federal petitions were denied be-
cause all state avenues had not been exhausted. Later, re-
spondent filed another petition based on Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399 (1986), in which the Court had decided that 
those who are insane cannot be executed. The District 
court dismissed this petition for being premature. The Ninth 
\ ;ircuit affirmed but stated that its ruling was not based on 
· the merits of the petition. On remand, the respondent 
sought to reopen the petition, fearing that the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was in effect. The 
AEDPA acts as a gatekeeper, forbidding successive habeas 
corpus petitions. The district court refused to reopen the 
petition. Later the respondent again sought to reopen the 
competence issue and was denied on AEDPA grounds. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed and allowed the petition. The 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Supreme Court held that to reopen a previous peti-
tion that had been found to be premature is not a "succes-
sive" habeas corpus petition. Therefore, it can not be barred 
by the AEDPA. This was not a separate petition but only a 
reopening of a former petition, according to the Court. The 
respondent is entitled to have this claim adjudicated when it 
became ripe. 
EXTRADITION 
In New Mexico ex. rei. Oritiz v. Reed, 118 S.Ct. 1860 
(1998), the Supreme Court addressed the extradition of a 
fugitive back to Ohio. Reed was paroled from a conviction 
for armed robbery and drug theft. Reed fled Ohio to New 
Mexico the next year after being informed by prison officials 
that they planned to revoke his parole. The Governor of 
New Mexico ordered the extradition of Reed. A state 
p,upreme court judge, however, granted habeas relief. Reed 
~ ,.lygued that he left Ohio under duress because he believed 
Ohio authorities would violate his due process rights and 
cause him physical harm. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
refused the extradition on the basis that the fugitive was not 
really a fugitive but a "refugee from injustice." The New 
Mexico Court believed that its Constitution's guarantee of 
the right to seek asylum prevailed over the extradition rights 
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of the other states. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the asylum state is not 
the place for a hearing on whether the defendant is a fugi-
tive under Article IV of the Constitution. The Court wrote: 
"In case after case we have held that claims relating to what 
actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the 
demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in 
the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues 
that must be tried in the court of that State, and not in those 
of the asylum State:· The Court also held that New Mexico 
Constitution's provision guaranteeing the right to seek safe-
ty does not prevail over Article IV of the Constitution. 
PROSECUTION IMMUNITY 
In Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1997), the Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which had 
held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity 
in executing a certification for determination of probable 
case. At the commencement of the criminal proceeding the 
prosecuting attorney filed a "Certification for Determination 
of Probable Cause:' This is the customary practice in 
Washington state courts. This document summarized the 
evidence in support of the charge and is sworn to by the 
prosecutor and resulted in the respondent's arrest and 
spending a night in jail. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the re-
spondent brought suit against the prosecutor based on two 
inaccurate statements in the certification.· 
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity did not apply to false statements 
used to support arrest warrants. When acting as an advo-
cate, the prosecutor has absolute immunity. The prosecutor 
in this case, however, was acting as a complaining witness 
and in that function only has qualified immunity. The act of 
personally attesting to the truth of the certification was the 
only action outside the scope of absolute immunity. The 
Court held that ~'[t]estitying about facts is the function of the 
witness, not the lawyer:' The Court concluded that when 
prosecutors step outside their role they are no longer enti-
tled to the same privileges. 
